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Talking of Michelangelo: Routine and 
Radical Inquiry into Literature and 
Aesthetics 
Bruce Gardiner 
 
How routinely do scholars of literature and aesthetics nowadays radically 
“challenge pre-established schemes,” as Elio Franzini contends those who 
contribute to Strange Sisters: Literature and Aesthetics in the Nineteenth 
Century do?
 1
 My answer must be, not often. Although all the essays in Strange 
Sisters merit serious attention, they routinely beg basic questions that they 
presume have already been settled, though every inquiry into literature and 
aesthetics necessarily unsettles them anew.
2
  
Ten of the fourteen essays in Strange Sisters consider linguistic and 
literary responses to visual and pictorial responses to sexual or racial matters. 
Subject matter most agitates the essayists, who are less agitated by pictures and 
vision, and least by literature and language. The estrangement of the sisters 
mirrors that of Mary and Martha of Bethany as Luke rather than John 
characterises them. Taciturn Mary, always a picture, attracts more attention 
than muttering Martha, persuaded not to make a scene, except in Paola 
Spinozzi’s essay on D. G. Rossetti’s translations from the Italian.
3
 Several of 
the essays cite Jonathan Crary’s Techniques of the Observer, but none any 
work investigating the techniques of the reader, even though understanding and 
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exploitation of the cognitive, physiological, and technological machinery of 
language changed more radically through the century than did understanding 
and exploitation of the machinery of vision.
4
 Francesca Orestano mentions 
“new optical technology” and the “dynamics of vision” but fails to mention 
either new verbal technology or the dynamics of language.
5
 Language is an 
engine whose offstage noise we no longer hear and vision a curtain that fades 
to a diaphaneity through which we descry matters of purportedly greater 
interest, as if language and vision themselves were not indubitably of the 
greatest interest, inattention to which may sabotage the interpretive capacities 
that depend on their peculiar licence and limitation. The essays in Strange 
Sisters so seldom encounter matters they cannot interpret that they can hardly 
have begun to interpret them satisfactorily. Let me consider a local instance of 
each kind of routine oversight, of literary language, pictorial composition, and 
interpretation.   
First, according to Hilary Fraser, Michael Field’s poem about 
Giorgione’s “The Sleeping Venus” frankly celebrates lesbian desire by way of 
sensual detail “lovingly described” and “appreciatively evoked.” But Fraser’s 
impressionistic description of the poem attends more to the picture Field paints 
than to the language with which Field paints it, preferring to confirm the 
obvious relation between “sight and sexuality” that Field establishes rather 
than elicit the less obvious relation between language and sexuality on which 
Field depends.
6
 Field’s nine quatorzains are in effect anti-sonnets, sestet pre-
empting octet, trochee overthrowing iambus, tetrameter displacing pentameter. 
In each quatorzain, the sole trochaic trimeter of the penultimate line trumps the 
sole iambic pentameter of the third, the octet’s choric couplets supplant the 
sestet’s colloquial interlaced rhyme, and incantatory catalectic trochaic lines 
extirpate more meditative iambic lines after two attempts in the sestet. Chant 
overcomes speech, dreaming overcomes wakefulness, and one’s own otherness 
obscures the otherness of others as masturbation supersedes more extrinsic 
arousal, including the specifically lesbian arousal to which Fraser would 
confine Field. But Field here makes the broadest ontological claim that she 
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masturbates therefore she is. Her pen or tongue mimes Venus’s finger in 
evoking a womanly body from earth’s body, as daughter from mother or figure 
from ground. She masturbates herself into being by twinning herself, fingered 
and fingerer, in a spellbound, spellbinding act of palingenesis renewed 
whenever she arouses language and senses it arousing her, an arousal that 
defines the literary as the essential fecundity of language, its pictorial and 
prosodic power of doodling. Field must have Michelangelo in mind when 
focussing on the finger, as does Frank O’Hara when in Lunch Poems he asks 
“Wouldn’t it be funny / if the Finger had designed us” otherwise than it has.
7
 
Fraser stymies her inquiry into Field’s poem by overlooking not only 
such literary matters but also the pictorial and art-historical matters that Field 
herself overlooks when she describes the painting, matters that necessarily 
inform her understanding of those she does describe. Field overlooks much that 
the painting depicts, such as the tree stump that protrudes from the ground 
immediately beyond Venus’s self-espousing hand, and much that the painting 
pointedly does not depict, such as the Cupid who elsewhere routinely 
accompanies Venus but has here been painted out, a matter of fact revealed 
during restoration of the painting in 1843. Field also overlooks much else that 
art historians routinely elicit from the picture, such as Titian’s hand in it.
8
 Even 
though Fraser routinely misnames the poet as the Fields rather than Field, by 
overlooking the collaboration between Giorgione and Titian, whose hands are 
hardly if at all distinguishable in this painting, she stymies her inquiry into 
Bradley and Cooper’s collaborative creation of Field, who in this poem may 
see themselves as the painters’ progeny, proof of the fertility of their 
collaboration and of collaboration generally.  
Second, according to Linda Goddard, Gauguin’s painting Man with an 
Axe depicts in the lower foreground leaves from a tree that are “not realistic, 
but decorative; they echo the branches above and the curves that divide the 
surface into patches of bright colour” in ways that indicate “painting can have 
the same suggestive properties as language.”
9
 Even so, Goddard’s description 
of the painting attends more to the picture Gauguin paints than to the visual 
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means by which he paints it. The sinuous pink lines that Goddard interprets as 
leaves or their watery reflections are, in terms of form, magnified abstractions 
of purple ripples created by a boat sailing across the top background and, in 
terms of colour, seepage, through a purple foreground, of a pink band across 
the middle ground that must underlie the purple. A striking two-dimensional 
decorative abstract motif echoes a recessive three-dimensional impressionist 
figurative one. Conversely, the serpentine purple trunk and branch of the palm 
tree in the middle ground are, in terms of form, atrophied abstractions of the 
muscular pliancy of the man and woman in the foreground and, in terms of 
colour, a capillary through which flows the purple of the foreground. 
Moreover, the tree lends its solidity and integrity to the man and woman, 
wooden mannequins rather than human beings, the pair fused by the 
superimposition of the man’s hip and elbow on the woman’s hand and head. 
The tree also lends its curvature to the boat’s sail, its colour to the boat’s wake, 
and both its curvature and colour to the boat’s outrigger, presumably formed 
from just such a tree. As the man with an axe abstracts characteristics and 
components of the tree from itself, so Gauguin’s painterly machinery abstracts 
characteristics and components of a Tahitian scene from itself in order to 
depict abstraction as such. His decorative composition quotes its disparately 
realist, impressionist, and expressionist sources just as Puvis de Chavannes 
quotes his sacred, classical, and neoclassical ones.
10
  
The dark blue fabric swathing the figures’ loins, dotted with starry and 
galactic smudges, suggests a world beyond the ken of the human eye and 
human body that unfolds around them as they sleep and engulfs them during 
sexual arousal, during which line, colour, and form slough off their routine 
representational duties and assume an imaginative autonomy through which the 
mind senses the body’s capacity for ecstatic abstract experience, most soberly 
depicted by Cézanne in The Bather,
11
 less soberly by Annie Besant and Charles 
Leadbeater in Thought-Forms,
12
 and ambivalently by Gauguin in Man with an 
Axe. Goddard tries to elucidate Gauguin’s ambivalence by analysing his 
writing rather than his painting, a deflection of attention that prevents her 
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explaining precisely how “painting can have the same suggestive properties as 
language.”
13
 
Third, according to Francesca Frigerio, Lewis Carroll’s careful 
compilation of his photograph albums and “their extreme variety and diversity 
as far as subjects are concerned” disprove the allegation that he is 
predominantly “a children portrayer.” The “discursive form” of the albums, 
“the rhythm they build page after page,” allegedly elicits from every 
photograph a proper meaning necessarily lost when photographs abstracted 
from the albums “fall prey to an altogether arbitrary right of inspection” that all 
too easily misinterprets Carroll as such a figure.
14
 But any interpretation of the 
albums depends on an arbitrary right to abstract their elements and imagine 
them ordered otherwise. Without such speculative disordering we could not 
understand their actual order. Photograph albums, like literature anthologies, 
impress us only by arousing our incorrigible perversity to abstract elements 
from them as we wish. Furthermore, no “system of classification” can avoid 
suppressing features it deems less significant in favour of others it deems 
more.
15
 Candour about something implies discretion about something else, so 
classification must entail encryption, a conundrum on which Derrida dwells in 
Archive Fever.
16
 The intelligibility of any complex phenomenon alters, 
however elusively, from one look to the next, both in its entirety, as through 
Nero’s emerald, and in the salience of any of its particulars, as through 
Monsieur Dupin’s green spectacles.
17
 
The two successive album pages that Frigerio considers closely, on 
which four photographs of children, three girls and a boy, precede two of tuna 
skeletons and one of Carroll’s brother, undermine rather than substantiate 
Frigerio’s thesis.
18
 Not only may the tuna serve as an elaborate alibi by their 
propensity to distract us, but they also import a predatory motif of cold-
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blooded beady-eyed carnivore, much as does T. E. Brown into his fantastic 
lullaby “High overhead,” in which a father, imagining both God’s eye and a 
cod’s eye watching his “little daughter” while she sleeps, fears his own eye 
may resemble the cod’s more than God’s as he tries to fathom the depths of his 
desire.
19
 Carroll’s collocation of children and tuna is no less surreal than Dalí’s 
Tuna Fishing or The Spectre of Sex Appeal.
20
 Our interpretation of Carroll’s 
fiction necessarily organises or disorganises our interpretation of his photo 
albums, and we very reasonably prefer to cherish him as “a children portrayer” 
rather than a tuna portrayer because by and large he writes about one and not 
the other.  
I do not press Fraser, Goddard, or Frigerio very hard or far toward the 
radical in making these suggestions or others like them, such as examining the 
letterpress of the first edition of Field’s Sight and Song or the texture and 
consistency of the paint in Gauguin’s Man with an Axe, or analysing 
statistically Carroll’s ordering of the photos in his albums, or fathoming why 
all three scholars and several of their fellows in Strange Sisters stop at such a 
polite and innocuous treatment of sexual desire and its literary and artistic 
manifestations. Fraser elicits a very civil lesbianism from a lyric about the 
extravagant power of sexual self-abuse. Goddard emphasises Gauguin’s 
“troubled attitudes to Tahitian women” rather than the painter’s irremediable 
anguish at the human body’s constitutive sexual disability, akin to Edna 
Pontelier’s in Chopin’s The Awakening.
21
 Frigerio hopes Carroll is no 
“children portrayer” though if he were his work might help calm the mind-
numbing hysteria that passes currently for debate about sexual attachments 
between older and much younger human beings. Luisa Calè finesses Maria 
Edgeworth’s relish in Belinda of effeminacy, mannishness, sexual divagation, 
and libertinage generally.
22
 Graham Smith does not wonder whether Victorian 
visitors to the New Sacristy in Florence enthuse so volubly about 
Michelangelo’s Lorenzo, Duke of Urbino, in order to put from their minds his 
Giuliano, Duke of Nemours, whose flesh-like breastplate and serpentine neck 
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are as immoderately erotic as Camille Paglia senses in Sexual Personae.
23
 And 
Eliza Bizzotto, mulling over Beardsley’s erotica, submits all too meekly to a 
general ruling that pornography is boring, without wondering whether the likes 
of The Story of O or The Story of the Eye are so, or whether we might not have 
to be bored stiff before we can become anything or anyone of consequence, as 
Heidegger contends in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.
24
 
It behoves us in all literary and aesthetic inquiry to face the most radical 
formal and substantive issues we can think of: what words say about wording, 
what pictures show about picturing, and how both establish that what they 
claim matters does indeed matter. Fraser, Goddard, and Frigerio cannot further 
answer the questions they pose because they do not ask the more basic 
questions on which those answers depend. Likewise, Maria Roli cannot further 
explain the exhilarating and disorienting effect of ballooning in Adalbert 
Stifter’s The Condor without adducing the contemporaneous development of 
projective geometry, a crucial prelude to special relativity, evolving from 
earlier studies of perspective, especially those in paintings of anamorphoses, 
apotheoses, and the apocalypse, because imaginary “emancipation” always 
precedes the actual.
25
 And Lucy Bending appears not to understand that Harriet 
Martineau’s guilty childhood fascination with the “pattern in floss silk, gay and 
beautifully shaded” on a “certain watch ribbon” secretly concedes that her 
wholesale extirpation of poetry and rhetoric from her prose is illusory. 
Martineau exposes the “slipperiness of the visual” as she represses the 
slipperiness of the verbal.
26
 Yet Thomas Young and others had already 
discovered that the polarisation of light generates the iridescence of materials 
such as shot silk, to which Tennyson likens poetry. Kant had already suggested 
that our sensitivity to the beauty of elusive phenomena such as rippling water 
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and flickering fire underlies our highest cognitive powers. And Herder had 
already insisted that language is essentially aesthetic and much the better a 
vehicle for clear thinking in being so.
27
 So Martineau’s “bafflement that things 
designed to be useful should become objects of observation in their own right” 
applies to her disregard of language as much as her regard for vision.
28
 
 
 
II 
But what in essence distinguishes radical from routine thinking? Kuhn’s 
“radical” distinction between them is now routine: 
No ordinary sense of the term “interpretation” fits these flashes of 
intuition through which a new paradigm is born. Though such 
intuitions depend upon the experience, both anomalous and 
congruent, gained with the old paradigm, they are not logically or 
piecemeal linked to particular items of that experience as an 
interpretation would be. Instead, they gather up large portions of that 
experience and transform them to the rather different bundle of 
experience that will thereafter be linked piecemeal to the new 
paradigm but not to the old.
29
 
Kuhn differentiates radical intuition from routine interpretation, which he 
envisages as a kind of plagiarism, much as Heidegger does the peculiarly 
authentic from the everyday, Coleridge the imagination from the fancy, and 
classical rhetoricians the metaphor from the metonym.
30
 For Coleridge, 
Heidegger, and Kuhn – Romantics all – radical thinking subverts routine at 
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times of crisis, precisely as the divine fiat destroys cumulative human error and 
prescribes a drastically discontinuous history of thought. But fanciful, 
metonymic, everyday analysis is no more inherently routine than imaginative, 
metaphoric, peculiar intuition is inherently radical. Routine thinking always 
entails what it has yet to think through as much as what it has stopped thinking 
about, both of which, however routinely obscured, are never radically absent. 
As Guy Debord insists in Society of the Spectacle, even plagiarism may serve 
as radical critique.
31
 The routine and the radical cannot be immiscibly distinct.  
Better to distinguish radical from routine thinking in terms of Foucault’s 
analysis in The Archaeology of Knowledge of disciplinary discourse into a field 
of memory ringing one of concomitance that in turn rings one of presence; 
better still to turn these rings inside out.
32
 Instead of Kuhn’s either/or, on/off 
switching, Foucault thinks of thinking as knitting together the here and there 
and the now and then more or less adventurously. The routine and the radical 
differ in degree rather than kind. Dean Simonton’s research into thinking falls 
in with Foucault’s:  
A flat associative hierarchy means that for any given stimulus, the 
creative person has many associations available, all with roughly 
equal probabilities of retrieval. Persons who are very low in 
creativity, by comparison, have steep associative hierarchies in 
which any given stimulus elicits only one or two responses in a 
highly predictable fashion.
33
 
Both ways of thinking about thinking derive from Plato’s allegory of the 
mind as a cave, thereby exposing its fundamental equivocation.
34
 Coleridge, 
Heidegger, and Kuhn suppose that radical thought is inherently alien to the 
mind into whose routine it forcibly irrupts, whereas Foucault and Simonton 
suppose that all thought knits the familiar with whatever is not yet and no 
longer so; the more curious and catholic its reach the more radical the thought. 
Heidegger’s lectures “On the Essence of Truth” in Being and Truth do little 
more than realise the tendency he shares with his fellow Romantics, all 
disaffected by the quotidian, to think of the mind as the creature of what it is 
forced to think rather than as the player that plays more or less freely with 
                                                 
31
 Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, anonymous trans. (Detroit: Black and Red, 
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32
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thoughts it shares casually with its fellow players.
35
 Psychoanalysis, in cahoots 
with surrealism, would explain the playful and multifocal ambit of all thought, 
just as Deleuze’s notion, in Difference and Repetition, of our inherently 
discordant mental faculties would explain its ineluctable multimodality.
36
  
What then distinguishes the radical from the routine in the way we think 
together? Contributors to Strange Sisters are so beholden to what they jointly 
inherit and find already handy that little crosstalk between remote and disparate 
fields leavens their thinking. Intent upon reading if not from the same page 
then from facing pages, contributors follow Kuhn and Febvre in hoping that the 
humanities might evolve “laboratories… well-structured teams… well-
coordinated investigations” into matters so deep that no lone thinker “could 
conceive of such an idea in all its magnitude.”
37
 But it is not at all clear that the 
concerted single-mindedness of thousands of CERN scientists searching for the 
Higgs boson as yet outdoes the myriad-mindedness of a lone spectator 
searching the shadows of Michelangelo’s statue of Lorenzo de’Medici. 
Moreover, contributors to Strange Sisters are studiously agreeable even though 
disagreement so enlivens thought that J. S. Mill insists “if opponents do not 
exist, it is indispensible to imagine them,” a dictum that governs Darwin’s 
thinking even as he disagrees with Mill about everything else.
38
 As more recent 
research reveals, prior differences of opinion generate novel solutions to 
problems much more reliably than does prior consensus.
39
 
With these distinctions in mind, I shall examine the radical problems of 
language, aesthetics, and interpretation that bedevil three of the nicest 
contributions to Strange Sisters, Calè’s on Belinda, Orestano’s on the 
picturesque in William Gilpin and John Ruskin, and Smith’s on Victorian 
views of Michelangelo’s Lorenzo. 
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III 
Luisa Calè claims that throughout Maria Edgeworth’s Belinda citation and 
verbal imitation of pictures awaken in the reader “a higher level of self-
awareness,” “a more creative engagement,” and a sense of “alternative paths” 
and “alternative endings,” whereas in the absence of such pictorial deference 
and pretence the novel mandates “immersive” and “absorptive forms of 
reading and acts of misrecognition that end up limiting the reader’s freedom.” 
Edgeworth thereby allegedly demonstrates the peculiar “creative potential of 
texts presented in the form of pictures,” undermining Charles Lamb and 
Lessing’s dicta about the basic disparity between them.
40
 But three no less 
basic considerations undermine Calè’s own dictum. 
First, throughout Belinda citation and verbal imitation of other narrative 
and conversational texts abstract the reader no less liberally. Characters, along 
with interested readers, calibrate the former’s resemblance to the many evoked 
by Smollett, Madame de Sévigné, La Rochefoucauld, Pope, Sterne, Radcliffe, 
Rousseau, Bernardin de St. Pierre, Clarence Hervey’s letters from the South 
Coast to Lady Delacour, and advertisements for “Packwood’s razor strops.”
41
 
Reading appears to abstract characters from their immediate circumstances as 
reliably as looking at pictures, if not more so.  
Second, self-reflective and self-absorbed being, self-critical and self-
forgetful reading, and mesmerised and disconcerted spectatorship are 
constitutively complementary facets of our experience, envisaged by Bernardin 
de St. Pierre as the two narrators of Paul and Virginia, on which Belinda so 
depends. A young stranger is thrilled by a story he has never heard before from 
an old neighbour who has mulled over it for twenty years before confronting 
his younger self in the person of the stranger, not unlike the two narrators of 
Wuthering Heights.
42
 One can become absorbed in one’s reflections, 
mesmerised by one’s surprise, and self-forgetful even when lacerating oneself, 
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because such facets of experience are not simply dichotomous. Specifically, 
writing by intermittent “word painting” differentiates reading from picturing 
only by suppressing this very difference so that, however fancifully, we 
mistake words for pictures, attenuating our sense of the actual materiality of 
one communicative medium in favour of the imaginary materiality of another, 
an exercise in imaginative abstraction that may expose aspects of 
communicative mediation otherwise obviated. Writing by means of 
intermittent “speech transcription” does likewise with reading and listening, as 
painting by metonymic citation of sound does with listening and looking. Any 
communicative medium is and must be liable to advert to its mode of 
mediation as the mind alternately recalls and forgets the immediate 
circumstances that press upon it. To identify picturing itself or its verbal 
pretence with liberation from immediate circumstance and reading as such with 
absorption by it, and to suppose Edgeworth does so, are untenable, even 
granting the slender pedagogical value of such an arbitrarily indicative 
distinction. Every reader is as familiar with Michel de Certeau’s self-
possession as with Georges Poulet’s self-abandonment, and recalls turning as 
many pages as he or she forgets turning.
43
  
Third, Calè does not quite grasp the basic entanglement Edgeworth 
posits between people and representations of themselves, although she 
recognises that pictorial representations are inherently abstractions (and 
metalepses). Representations, whether pictorial or verbal, actual or fanciful, 
trigger the transformation of those they represent by inciting in them a desire to 
resemble or counter the images of themselves that they and others evolve from 
their current characters. An ever-changing album of representations refreshes 
and regulates a native plasticity of personality. Belinda herself is so sensitive to 
this self-representational machinery or chemistry that she acts as an adjuvant or 
emollient moderating both the intractability of characters such as Lord and 
Lady Delacour and the volatility of others such as Harriet Freke, paying due 
regard to the virtues and vices of each extreme, and fostering and harnessing 
both as essential imaginative resources. Edgeworth distinguishes this 
“romance” of person and representation from “common novels” in which 
people are invariably who they are and representations of them are either true 
or false, as appears to be the case in Burney’s Evelina and, more poignantly, in 
Paul and Virginia, in which the heroine cannot conceive of becoming other 
than she is, even of disrobing to avoid drowning. She flees from all sociable 
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and erotic transfigurations of herself in an agony akin to Thel’s as Blake 
records it.
44
 Edgeworth’s romance of representation is Shakespearian, Lady 
Delacour’s final reanimation as wonderful as Hermione’s in The Winter’s Tale, 
whereas Evelina’s restoration and recognition as Belmont’s daughter, “image 
of my long lost Caroline,” is satisfying in the manner of a police procedural.
45
 
Edgeworth proposes that representations transform those they represent. Calè 
acquiesces in Sir Joshua Reynold’s hackneyed dictum that a painting 
represents “one point of time only,” without defining what time is so that it 
permits such puncturing, and without seeing that Edgeworth regards the 
persistence, succession, differentiation, and repetition of our self-representation 
as the medium of our sense of being in time.
46 
 
 
 
IV 
Our sense of being in time is precisely what escapes Francesca Orestano as she 
considers Ruskin’s theory of the picturesque as a sophistication of William 
Gilpin’s. Orestano finds that in “dealing with the picturesque,” Ruskin 
“acknowledges the impossibility of compounding it into a unified system” 
chiefly because he cannot reconcile its formal definition with its moral or, 
rather, pathetic associations except by way of “ambiguity, paradox and 
estrangement.”
47
 
Ruskin’s misattribution to Turner of engravings of a pair of scenes by 
Gilpin depicting dawn and sunset does not epitomise Ruskin’s mistakes and 
vacillations over the picturesque as Orestano insists but rather reveals how 
Ruskin elicits from Gilpin by way of his acutest student a robustly conciliatory 
theory of it.
48
 When noting “Turner’s depth of feeling in looking at landscape 
from youth to age,” Ruskin’s paired terminal prepositional phrases are 
ambiguously adverbial, modifying “looking,” and adjectival, qualifying 
“landscape,” implying that the looking and the looked at are equally subject to 
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time, and that the “depth” of Turner’s sense is not only spatial but also 
temporal. The predisposition that Ruskin’s repetition of “already” signals, in 
his notes on the two engravings, saturates the evanescence of dawn and sunset 
with a persistence lasting from birth to death, with colour the sign of the first 
and monochromatic form of the second. For Ruskin, the picturesque evokes the 
beauty of being in time, the complexity of which involves our concurrent 
abstraction from one dimension of time, the moment to moment, and 
subjection to another, the year by year, and their converse, so that we see no 
less freely through time than through space, both equally “effects of light.” 
That Turner “retired to put himself under such discipline” as the picturesque 
denotes suggests that we might cultivate our native susceptibility to time into 
an ethical, aesthetic vocation whose emblem would be “the ideal of the stone 
pine” reconciling sensitivity with insensitivity to time, as may the sheep-like 
rocks and stone-like birds that Thoreau sees as he climbs Mt Ktaadn and as 
may the leech-gatherer that Wordsworth encounters in “Resolution and 
Independence.”
49
 A “temper as merciless as the rocks” viewing ruin with 
equanimity and a humane sympathy viewing it with unease, regret, and 
indignation are not, despite Orestano, simply alternatives.
50
 Together they 
describe the creative and creaturely ambivalence of our being in time, which 
entails the untimely as much as the timely, as it does, for instance, in the 
vividly picturesque third stanza of Yeats’ “Easter 1916.”
51
 
Gilpin himself comes close to recognising the picturesque as the 
aesthetic dimension of being in time. Although conceding that “It would be 
hard to assign a reason why we are more taken with Prospects of a ruinous 
kind, than with views of Plenty and Prosperity in their greatest perfection,” 
Gilpin assigns just such a reason when viewing a “dissolving pile, which has 
triumphed over the injuries of time.” The “fragmentation, mutilation, intricacy, 
and decay” of the ruin echoes Hutton’s vision of interminable, gradual 
dissolution and anticipates Carnot’s of entropy, itself deriving from novel mid-
eighteenth-century conceptions of heat as atomic perturbation.
52
 For Gilpin, the 
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picturesque is a technique for producing a picture of time without the 
allegorical figures on which Claude Lorrain and Nicholas Poussin depend. The 
landscape itself becomes the figure of time rather than being disfigured 
adventitiously by it, its evolution over centuries and millennia as clear as its 
evolution hour by hour. For instance, in the medium-term of several centuries, 
Gilpin’s pictures effectively portray Henry VIII and Cromwell as Great 
Britain’s greatest dilapidators.
53
 Yet for Ruskin, the picturesque is the temporal 
facility of human vision itself, the engine of all beauty and intelligibility, not 
merely one particular kind of beauty or technique of beautification, the insight 
at which Gilpin stalls.  
Orestano mistakenly agrees with Christopher Hussey that the 
picturesque was “the first step in the movement towards abstract aesthetic 
values.”
54
 But the first step was Kant’s; the next steps, in opposing directions, 
Ruskin and Schopenhauer’s. Kant’s aesthetics is scrupulous in its ontological 
neutrality, our sense of beauty indistinguishably the same whether prompted by 
real or imaginary phenomena, so that neither the real nor the imaginary is 
inherently or differently beautiful.
55
 But Schopenhauer thereupon argues that 
only disinterested timeless imaginative representation and the non-being it 
evokes are beautiful, the view to which Wilde finally subscribes in The Picture 
of Dorian Gray.
56
 On the contrary, Ruskin argues that our imaginative 
response to being itself, which he never reduces to the here and now, is 
inherently beautiful, however difficult it might be to understand its beauty, the 
understanding to which Proust thereupon devotes himself. “Things seen by the 
artist” and “things as they are” are Ruskin’s shorthand for Schopenhauer’s 
distinction between representation and being, the pair that Schopenhauer would 
sunder and Ruskin reconcile.
57
  
Even this does not exhaust the significance of Ruskin’s seizure of 
Gilpin’s theory of the picturesque. Analysing Turner’s art in Modern Painters 
as quintessentially picturesque, Ruskin extrapolates from it a machinery of 
unconscious memory, metonymic displacement, metaphoric association, and 
polysemous condensation that anticipates Freud’s The Interpretation of 
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Dreams, such that Ruskin and Schopenhauer both lead us from Kant to Freud 
and Proust, though by contrary paths, Ruskin’s path the more picturesque 
because it is the path of the picturesque itself.
58
  
 
 
V 
In the strictest sense, the pathway or tradition that Smith traces from Samuel 
Rogers through Barrett Browning to Hawthorne in their reactions to 
Michelangelo’s New Sacristy statuary is an optical illusion as three tourists on 
independent paths successively cross the same line of sight. According to 
Smith, “well-read Victorian pilgrims to the New Sacristy shared a common 
vision” that “originated with Rogers.”
59
 But although these pilgrims venerate 
the same relic by the same name, Michelangelo’s statue of Lorenzo de’Medici, 
they evoke a radically different being and meaning from it, in radically 
different language, three disparate traditions of interpretation clashing rather 
than one tradition evolving each time that one of its exponents hands it on to 
another. 
For Rogers, in “Florence,” the New Sacristy is a tomb in which he may 
“Visit the dead” to contemplate being “Turned into stone” like Lorenzo, to 
remind himself that living entails an imaginative reconnoitring of death that 
anticipates a last and lasting visit with the dead as one of them.
60
 The statuary’s 
uncanny liveliness and the sacristy’s intensification of it bring the not-yet-dead 
as close to the dead as the not-yet-dead can imagine, arresting time itself in the 
never-to-be-perfected bodies of the four nudes, or ignudi. The figure of 
Lorenzo captures Rogers’ attention as he bids everyone “Mark him well” 
because Lorenzo himself marks everyone well: “He meditates, his head upon 
his hand” as his shadowed visage “fascinates” like the “basilisk.” Lorenzo 
offers the eye he casts on death, which is also the eye that death casts on the 
living, to the living themselves so that they may forearm themselves by this 
imaginative exchange of looks at their being in time. Rogers’ blank verse befits 
this exchange not only by its end-stopped lines that pause expectantly to listen 
for the slightest whispered response but also by its own whispering repetition 
of syllables ending in “l,” echoing that first heard in an adverbial “still” and 
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growing loudest when they chime at four line endings – scowls, scull (sic), 
intolerable, majestical – two each side of Rogers’ mesmerised account of 
mesmerism – “like the basilisk, / It Fascinates” – as yet unintelligible sounds 
extorted from the poet by a kind of being he senses as not quite yet his own. 
The stolid pulse of the verse and the phonemic shiver that ruffles it inoculate it 
with the deathlike and death-defying durability that Rogers senses in 
Michelangelo’s marble, so that his writing evokes breath as the sculptured 
stone evokes muscular animation, both artworks formally miming the 
substantive dichotomy or “two-fold” that they contemplate. Rogers is to 
Michelangelo as Pound to Gaudier-Brzeska, both hoping to follow Horace: 
exegi monumentum aere perennius; non omnis moriar.
61
 
For Barrett Browning, in “Casa Guidi Windows,” being is simply the 
here and now and art a residue of the past that happily directs the present to a 
better future, as Michelangelo might the Risorgimento.
62
 Michelangelo’s 
statuary is fixed forever in the marble-block of its history, his artistic creativity 
representing a revolutionary spirit that longs to overthrow the political tyranny 
of his patrons, the Medici. Whereas Rogers ignores the sculptor in favour of his 
sculpture, Barrett Browning conjures with Michelangelo’s name, takes his 
work personally, grants him the autonomy she presumes her own, and 
understands his work immediately as if the same popular will inspires both it 
and her own. She regards the figures in the sacristy as would the audience of an 
episode of the Twilight Zone mannequins in a department store, suspecting that 
though they simply “wait” while we look at them they will spring into life as 
soon as we look away, when the “marble film” “’Twixt the artist’s soul and 
works” dissolves. Just add a measure of revolutionary zest; the times of day, 
the titanic ignudi, will do the rest. Lorenzo is the ensemble’s salient figure for 
Barrett Browning because she cannot see his eyes or know what they see, 
which occultation she construes not merely as blindness but a blind repelling 
her insight, at which she takes offence. Given her popularly endowed gift of 
penetration, any failure to see or to understand cannot be hers, but must be due 
to her interlocutor’s obscurantism, despite egregious instances to the contrary, 
including the veil over Moneta’s face in Keats’ The Fall of Hyperion and the 
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hat over the sower’s head in Millet’s The Sower.
63
 Deprecating the “everlasting 
shadow” on Lorenzo’s face, Barrett Browning forgets that shadows are merely 
the “trompe-l’oeil of the sun,” as Gauguin quips, effaced by any mirror and 
candle.
64
 Gleefully algorithmic (Florence + Lawrence = abhorrence), Barrett 
Browning’s ababab pentameter sexains sound like so many steadily lobbed 
percussion bombs, the syntax lagging one line behind the stanza so that the 
second line of each is peculiarly striking, as if each thought explodes in the 
mind exactly one pentameter after it hits the ear. For Barrett Browning, the 
interpretation of art is essentially a polemic about the politics of the 
imagination.  
For Nathaniel and Sophia Hawthorne the interpretation of art is sociable 
and contestable. Not only do one’s ways of seeing depend so much on those 
who have fostered them and on others who may yet influence them, but also 
each artwork is unlike any other, whether an element of a logical totality or a 
newly-evolved species of imaginative sensitivity, as Pater would envisage so 
inconsistently as he vacillated between Hegelian and Darwinian theories of 
art.
65
 Nathaniel and Sophia compare notes, consult Hiram Powers, whose 
expert opinion they discount, and examine Michelangelo’s statue of Lorenzo in 
light of the casts and pictures of it they have already seen. They conclude that 
Michelangelo depicts Lorenzo “brooding over some great design,” evincing a 
look “far beyond personal considerations,” and thus serving as “a fit medium 
for disembodied thought,” an embodiment of disembodiment in which 
Michelangelo sculpts “his highest touches upon air and duskiness” as 
ethereally perhaps as James Turrell now sculpts light.
66
 The figure of Lorenzo 
irritates Nathaniel into a heightened sense of his own sensitivities and of 
everything that escapes them – “I feel I do not come at all which it involves” – 
comparing the way in which the statue holds his attention with the way in 
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which the ghost in Hamlet holds his son’s, Shakespeare as usual betokening the 
imagination’s nearest approach to comprehending the incomprehensible.
67
  
Yet as disparate as are these three interpretations of Michelangelo’s 
Lorenzo, they each overlook the same flagrantly emblematic details: the eyes 
on the aquiline visor obscuring Lorenzo’s own and the eyes and ears of the cat-
like, bat-like chimera carved on the end of the box, perhaps a despatch box, on 
which his left arm rests.
68
 Lorenzo sees with the eyes of the sharpest-sighted 
diurnal and nocturnal spies, with a superhuman penetration befitting one who 
must see not only what all his subjects see but also what they cannot yet see 
that can nevertheless already see them, intelligence he may just have gleaned 
from a despatch, if that is what his clenched left hand enfolds. He is, after all, 
the dedicatee of Machiavelli’s The Prince. Dalí offers an extraordinary reading 
of Michelangelo’s figure in his Warrior, in which Lorenzo’s eyes become 
miniatures of his face, in the form of masked Catalan warriors, whose lances 
project from his eyes’ tear ducts, a general in Hobbesian fashion composed of 
his own troops.
69
 
The reader will decide if the inquiries into literature and aesthetics in 
Strange Sisters are more radical than I allege and mine less than I hope. 
Confining myself largely to the evidence that the volume’s contributors 
adduce, I worry how meagrely they gloss the texts they quote and the pictures 
they describe and reproduce. Apparently, reading and looking closely are 
radical departures from current critical routine, though their necessity is 
confirmed not only by the greatest exponents of literary and aesthetic inquiry 
but also by the subjects of our particular inquiries – Edgeworth on Bernardin 
de St Pierre, Ruskin on Gilpin, and Rogers and others on Michelangelo – 
whose example we must try to emulate in order to uncover, as Heidegger has 
it,  
the unthought in a thinker’s thought…. What is un-thought is there 
in each case only as the un-thought. The more original the thinking, 
the richer will be what is unthought in it. The unthought is the 
greatest gift that thinking can bestow.
70
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